Jump Bidding and Budget Constraints in All-Pay Auctions and Wars of Attrition by Eddie Dekel et al.
Jump Bidding and Budget Constraints in All-Pay
Auctions and Wars of Attrition￿
Eddie Dekel, Matthew O. Jackson, Asher Wolinskyy
revision: August 10, 2006
Abstract
We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins
an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two
bidders alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are
common knowledge including bidders￿valuations. We analyze how the ability to
￿jump-bid,￿ or raise bids by more than the minimal necessary increment a⁄ects
the outcome of the auction. We also study the impact of budget caps on total bids.
We show that both of these features, which are common in practice but absent
from the previous literature, matter signi￿cantly in determining the outcome of
the auctions.
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11 Introduction
A wide variety of economic interactions are usefully modeled as an all-pay auction or war-
of-attrition.1 The standard analysis of such competitions is one where bids or committed
resources increase at a given rate per unit time, and players simply decide whether to
stay in or drop out of the auction or contest. In this paper, we consider a dynamic version
of this game that di⁄ers from the standard versions in that the players have discretion
over how much they increase their bid by each time they move. Thus, the model can be
thought of as an English-all-pay auction in which the bidders are allowed to ￿jump-bid￿
or as a war-of-attrition situation in which the players are not limited to investing at some
￿xed rate per unit of time, but can commit large amounts of resources at once to the
contest. We analyze this model with and without the presence of budget caps on total
expenditures by bidders. We show how the ability to make jump bids, and also how the
presence of budget constraints, alter the equilibrium behavior.
The ability to jump-bid, or commit a large amount of resources at a time to the
contest, changes the nature of equilibrium completely. For instance, when the players
can only invest at a ￿xed rate, there are equilibria in which the player with the lower
value wins with high probability. This equilibrium behavior changes dramatically if
players are allowed to ￿jump bid￿ . The simple intuition is that the higher valued player
can preemptively bid an amount that the lower valued player would not wish to match.
This guarantees that the higher valued player should have a positive expected payo⁄
from the auction. In fact, this turns out to guarantee that the higher valued player
wins the auction, even though such a preemptive bid is never made. The speci￿cs of the
equilibrium depend on the environment (e.g., what is known about players￿valuations,
and whether budgets are ￿nite) in ways that we discuss in detail.
Budget caps a⁄ect the bidding in an interesting way. In the context of a sealed-bid
all-pay auction setting, budget caps that exceed the bidders values do not a⁄ect the bid-
ding. However, in a dynamic all-pay setting, even budget caps that exceed the bidders￿
valuations can be important. Since past bids become sunk costs, bidders may end up
bidding more than their values, at least o⁄-the-equilibrium-path, and budget caps may
a⁄ect the equilibrium even when they exceed valuations. Indeed, our analysis shows that
in some situations the bidder with the larger budget wins the auction rather than the bid-
der with the larger valuation, even when budgets greatly exceed valuations, as they alter
play o⁄ the equilibrium path, which then in￿ uences equilibrium outcomes. As budget
1As is well known, the war of attrition is equivalent to a sealed bid, all-pay second-price auction.
2limits operate o⁄ the equilibrium path, they might never be reached in equilibrium.
Most of our analysis concerns complete-information all-pay auctions, where bidders￿
valuations and any budget constraints are common knowledge. We do this for several
reasons. First, it makes the role of jump-bidding and budget constraints very clear.2
Second, the analysis of equilibrium is already rich and at times subtle, even with com-
plete information. In the closing discussion we provide some results on the incomplete
information case.
As emphasized in the opening footnote, Leininger (1991) already has results that are
essentially the same as most of those in the present paper. His is a complete-information,
sequential, all-pay auction with hetrogenous values and budgets. Since he does not
restrict the bids to a grid (as we do), he considers "-equilibria. He also seems to restrict
attention to Markovian strategies. Although these di⁄erences do not matter much for
the main results, the present paper might still be useful as the exposition here di⁄ers
from that in Leininger￿ s paper and as it includes a brief discussion of the incomplete-
information case.3
2 De￿nitions
Most of our analysis is of a complete-information setting, where valuations for the object
and budgets are common knowledge. When we depart from this assumption, we will
make it clear.
2.1 Bidders, Values, and Budgets
We concentrate on auctions with two bidders and later comment on the extension to
more bidders.
2Actually, there are at least two di⁄erent roles of jump-bidding. The complete information analysis
isolates the jump-bid as a ￿preemptive￿tool. The incomplete information analysis also brings in the
jump-bid as a signaling device.
3Oneil (1986) also analyzes a dynamic all-pay auction with budget constraints but focuses on the
symmetric case with equal valuations and equal budgets. Harris and Vickers (1985) present a model of
race which is also a dynamic all-pay contest with unlimited budgets. Dixit and Nalebu⁄ (1991) present
an example that has some aspects of preemptive investment. We have two other papers that analyze
vote buying (Dekel, Jackson and Wolinsky (2006-a,b)) where we use related models. Those models are
more complicated, since the bidders compete for buying the votes of a majority of the voters rather than
just a single object, and so the impact of jump bidding and budget constraints are di¢ cult to isolate,
and a⁄ected by the distinct nature of the majority game.
3Let Vi denote bidder i￿ s private value for the object.
A bidder who bids a total of bi and wins the object has a ￿nal utility of Vi ￿ bi. A
bidder who bids a total of bi and does not win the object has a ￿nal utility of ￿bi.
Let Bi denote i￿ s budget. Bi takes on values in <+ [ f1g.
A bidder is never allowed to bid more than his or her budget.
There is a smallest money unit " > 0, so bids and budgets (when ￿nite) are whole
multiples of ".
To simplify the analysis we assume that the Vi￿ s are not multiples of ". We will let
[Vi]" denote the maximal multiple of " that is smaller than Vi.
We eliminate degenerate cases by assuming that Vi > " for each i.
2.2 A Description of the Auctions
We consider two versions of an all-pay auction. In each version, time proceeds in discrete
periods t 2 f1;2;:::g. Bidders alternate in their moves, so that bidder 1 bids on odd
dates and bidder 2 bids on even dates. Bids are nonnegative and can only be increased.
In a jump-bidding all-pay auction, a bidder who is called upon to move can choose
to raise its bid to any higher feasible bid or to leave it unchanged. We will refer to the
latter move as "dropping out" of the auction. The auction ends at the ￿rst time where
either:4
(i) bidder 1 is called upon to bid and bidder 1￿ s bid does not exceed bidder 2￿ s last
bid, in which case bidder 2 wins; or
(ii) bidder 2 is called upon to bid and bidder 2￿ s bid does not match or exceed bidder
1￿ s latest bid, in which case bidder 1 wins.
If the auction never ends, then each bidder gets a utility of ￿1.
A no-jump all-pay auction is as above except that a bidder can increase its outstanding
bid by at most " in each step. This is the discrete version of the "war-of-attrition."
The alternating moves and the tie-breaking in favor of bidder 2 introduce a slight
asymmetry in the auctions.
Unless otherwise stated, the solution concept is subgame-perfect equilibrium.
4This is equivalent (in terms of equilibrium outcomes) to stopping the auction after successive rounds
where each bidder has had a chance to bid and has not changed his or her bid.
42.3 A Useful Lemma on Dropping Out and Mixing
The following Lemma is useful in a number of our results. We note that it holds regardless
of whether jumps are permitted and/or budgets are ￿nite or in￿nite.
Lemma 1 Consider a subgame starting with a move by bidder i. If i bids (i.e., increases
its standing bid) with positive probability in an equilibrium, then in the equilibrium con-
tinuation j drops out with positive probability at any node that follows a bid by i.
Note that this implies that in any equilibrium, the only (decision) node on the equi-
librium path where either bidder ever has a strictly positive expected payo⁄is at the ￿rst
node. Note also that, if the bidding continues past the ￿rst node, it must involve mixing
or dropping out completely at every subsequent node reached on the equilibrium path.
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose to the contrary that there is a subgame starting at a node
t and an equilibrium in that subgame where i makes a bid with positive probability, and
following some bid that i makes with positive probability at t, j stays in at the next
node, t0, with probability one.
First, consider the case where the equilibrium strategies in this subgame are pure
on the equilibrium path. Let t00 be the ￿rst subsequent node on the path where some
bidder drops out (such a node exists as this is an equilibrium path and the payo⁄ of
an in￿nite play is negative in￿nity). The bidder who moves at t00 must have 0 expected
continuation utility conditional on being at t00 (or the bidder would strictly prefer to stay
in, and would not be exiting). Since by assumption the strategies are pure on the path,
node t00 is reached with probability 1 in the continuation. If the bidder who moves at
t00 is i, then i has a negative expected utility at t since i￿ s payment increases between t
and t00 only to attain 0 expected utility at t00 after having already sunk the incremental
payment. If the bidder who moves at t00 is j, then by the same reasoning j has a negative
expected utility conditional on making a bid at t0 which precedes t00. Thus, we reach a
contradiction in both cases.
Next, consider the case where the equilibrium strategies in this subgame may be
mixed on the equilibrium path. In this case there is a set of paths which may occur with
positive probability when the equilibrium is played. We construct a new equilibrium by
selecting from these paths as follows. At node t bidder i makes the bid that leads to
the node t0 where player j stays in with certainty. At node t0 bidder j chooses, from
among the actions played with positive probability in the given equilibrium, an action
that maximizes bidder i￿ s expected payo⁄in the continuation of this equilibrium. At the
5next node i again selects an action that maximizes j￿ s expected equilibrium payo⁄. The
selection continues in this manner ￿with the bidder in control breaking own indi⁄erences
so as to bene￿t the other bidder ￿at the subsequent nodes up to the Kth node on this
path from t, provided the game does not terminate prior to that. The number K is such
that K" > 2maxfV1;V2g. At all other nodes of the subgame, the behavior of the original
equilibrium remains.
It follows almost directly from its construction that this selection of actions through
K steps starting from t, together with the remaining strategies at other nodes from the
original equilibrium, forms a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the subgame starting at
node t. One can argue this by backwards induction starting from the most distant node
out of the ￿rst K nodes on the path from t, using the fact that these are paths of the
original given equilibrium.
Consider this new SPE. The ￿rst K moves in this equilibrium are pure. It must then
be that at least one of the players drops out in these K moves, so that the equilibrium
path itself is entirely pure. This follows since if play did last for K or more moves, then
i￿ s incremental payo⁄ starting at node t would be at most Vi ￿ (K=2)" < 0, which is
less the incremental payo⁄ of quitting at t, which would be a contradiction. Therefore,
the argument used above for the case of equilibrium strategies that are pure on the
equilibrium path applies, and we conclude that, contrary to the initial hypothesis, j
cannot stay at node t0 with probability 1.
3 In￿nite Budgets
We begin by analyzing all-pay auctions when there are no limits to budgets.
3.1 No jumps and In￿nite Budgets
We start with the benchmark case of no jump bidding and unlimited budgets. Without
jump bidding, a bidder￿ s strategy can simply be speci￿ed as a probability of remaining
in the auction as a function of the time.
Proposition 1 In the game with no jump-bidding and in￿nite budgets, the set of all
equilibria can be characterized in terms of their equilibrium paths as follows. For any
p 2 [0;1], there exists an equilibrium in which bidder 1 drops with probability p in the
￿rst node. If p = 0, then there is a range of equilibria in which in the next node bidder
2 drops with probability q ￿ "=V1, and if q < 1 then the bidders drop thereafter with
6probabilities "=V2 and "=V1, respectively. If p 2 (0;1), then in each subsequent node on
the equilibrium path bidder 2 drops out with probability "=V1 and bidder 1 drops out with
probability "=V2. If p = 1, then this is clearly the end of the equilibrium path.
The proofs of all propositions appear in the appendix.
Note that in a subset of these equilibria, the bidder with the low valuation wins with
higher probability, including an equilibrium in which the low valuation bidder wins with
certainty. Three of the equilibria are Markov perfect (a subgame perfect equilibrium
where each bidder￿ s probability of staying in the auction is independent of time): the
mixed equilibrium in which the bidders drop with probabilities "=V2 and "=V1 respec-
tively at all nodes, and the two pure equilibria in which one bidder always continues with
probability one and the other always drops out. The Markov-perfect mixed-strategy equi-
librium is also the only symmetric equilibrium, in the sense that each bidder￿ s behavior
has the same functional form (as dependent on the pair of valuations). Notice that this
equilibrium is one of those in which the low-value bidder wins with higher probability.
Some of the literature on the war of attrition uses reputation e⁄ects to re￿ne away
the multiplicity of equilibria.5 Such e⁄ects can be introduced here by assuming that each
one of the bidders has with small probability an obstinate type who never drops out. The
reputation game that results has a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium involves mixed
strategies and hence its outcome is a distribution. If the probability of the obstinate types
is taken to zero, the equilibrium outcome distribution approaches the outcome in which
the higher valuation bidder wins immediately. We show next that the simple ability to
jump bid will directly single out this as the unique equilibrium outcome, without any
need for augmenting the game with noise (and corresponding beliefs).
3.2 Jump-bidding and In￿nite Budgets.
We now consider the case where jump-bidding is allowed and show that in all equilibria
the high-value bidder wins for certain. Thus, the introduction of jump-bidding selects one
out of the range of equilibrium outcomes that arise when jump-bidding is not allowed.
Proposition 2 In all equilibria of the game with jump-bidding and in￿nite budgets:
(i) If V2 + " ￿ V1, then bidder 1 bids once to a price of " and then bidder 2 drops out.
5See Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Abreu and Gul (1991).
7(ii) If V1 +" ￿ V2, then bidder 1 drops out immediately and bidder 2 wins at a price of
0.
While the presence of jump-bidding narrows down the equilibrium set drastically,
jump-bids are never used on the equilibrium path. It is simply the possibility that
they could be used that is critical. To understand the role of jump-bids it is useful to
examine how they preclude equilibria in which the lower value bidder wins. Suppose that
V1 + " ￿ V2. Clearly, there is no SPE in which 1 wins by bidding ", since by bidding
[V2]" (recall that [Vi]" denotes the largest whole multiple of " that is still smaller than
Vi), bidder 2 can force bidder 1 to drop out (since in order to stay in the auction bidder 1
would have to increase its bid by more than V1). Since [V2]" < V2, bidder 2 would prefer
to win in this way than to let bidder 1 win. But what if V1 is close to V2 and bidder 1
starts with a higher bid, say [V1]"? If bidder 2 responds by bidding [V2]", bidder 1 may
take a large lead again by increasing its bid by [V1]", so it is not immediately clear that
bidder 2 must win in any SPE. To understand why this must be indeed the case, consider
a race in which bidder 1 increases its standing bid by [V1]" in each round and bidder 2
increases its standing bid by [V2]" in each round. Eventually, there must come a point
where in order to stay in the auction, bidder 1 must increase its bid by more than V1.
At this point, in any SPE, bidder 1 would drop out. Anticipating 2￿ s response, bidder 1
would already drop out in the previous round, and inducting backwards, bidder 2 must
win this race before it starts.
Finally, if [V2]" = [V1]", then there exist multiple equilibria. For instance, there are
equilibria where i always bids the minimal increment to stay in (if it does not exceed i￿ s
value) and j always exits.
4 Finite Budgets
Now, we consider the impact of limits on bidders￿budgets, since this is an obvious feature
of applications and so it is important to know if this feature has an impact on equilibrium
outcomes. The analysis that follows applies when either of the bidders￿budgets is ￿nite
(and it could still be that the other bidder￿ s budget is in￿nite).
The following lemma points out an important di⁄erence between the ￿nite and the
in￿nite-budget cases, which will be useful in the subsequent analysis..
Lemma 2 Consider an arbitrary subgame in a game (with or without jump-bidding)
where at least one bidder has a ￿nite budget and starting with a move by bidder i. All
8equilibrium continuations are in pure strategies (on and o⁄ the equilibrium path).
Proof of Lemma 2: Given that at least one bidder has a ￿nite budget, the subgame
starting at any node is ￿nite. Consider any equilibrium continuation starting from an
arbitrary node. Consider any last node (on or o⁄ the equilibrium path) where some
player mixes, so that in all further subgames, pure strategies are played. By Lemma 1, it
must be that if this player, say i, bids, then the other player must drop out at the next
node (as the other player must drop with some probability by the Lemma, and is playing
a pure strategy by hypothesis). Given that Vi is not a multiple of " this means that for
i to be willing to make such a bid, i must have a strictly positive payo⁄ from the bid.
Thus, i cannot mix at the node.
Note that this Lemma is not in contradiction with Lemma 1. In fact, coupled together,
they imply that when at least one of the bidders has a ￿nite budget, then in any subgame
(where i is the bidder who moves ￿rst), either bidder i drops out immediately and bidder
j wins at no incremental cost, or bidder i bids enough to stay in the auction and then
bidder j drops out at the next node.
4.1 No Jump-Bidding and Budget Limits
Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately imply that, when jump-bidding is not allowed, the equilibria
in the presence of budget limits di⁄er from those in the in￿nite budget case. Indeed, the
following proposition establishes that, without jumps, the bidder with the largest budget
wins, regardless of the values.
Proposition 3 In the unique equilibrium in the game with no jump-bidding and at least
one ￿nite budget, bidder 1 wins at a price of " if B1 > B2, and bidder 2 wins at a price
of 0 otherwise (i.e., if B2 ￿ B1).
The intuition here is straightforward and by backwards induction. Once the auction
has reached bidding within " of the lower budget constraint, it is clear that the higher
budget player has an incentive to stay in, and the other player to drop out. Then, by
induction, the same is true within " of such a node, and this argument rolls backwards
to the beginning of the game.
94.2 Jump-bidding with Budget Limits
The analysis of equilibria when there is jump-bidding and a cap on at least one bidder￿ s
budget is the most complex of the various cases that we have analyzed. There is a subtle,
but intuitive, interaction between valuations and budgets that determines which bidder
wins. Let us ￿rst state the characterization of the winning bidder, and then provide
discussion of the characterization and a more detailed description of the equilibrium
structure.
Proposition 4 In all equilibria in the game with jump-bidding and at least one ￿nite
budget:
(i) If minfB1;[V1]"g > minfB2;[V2]"g, bidder 1 wins.
(ii) If minfB1;[V1]"g ￿ minfB2;[V2]"g, bidder 2 wins, except if (iii) below applies.
(iii) If B1 > B2, [V1]" ￿ [V2]" and B2 < k[V1]", where k is the minimal integer such that
(k ￿ 1)[V2]" ￿ k[V1]" (setting k = 1 if [V2]" = [V1]"), then bidder 1 wins.
Since bidder i cannot bid above Bi and would not like to bid above Vi, natural intuition
would suggest that the winner is determined by the minimum of budgets and values. Parts
(i) and (ii) of the proposition con￿rm that usually this is indeed the case, but Part (iii)
describes an exception. Under certain circumstances, the ￿rst mover advantage of bidder
1 is translated to a win even though minfB1;[V1]"g < minfB2;[V2]"g, as discussed below.
To understand these results, it is helpful to ￿rst discuss the impact of ￿nite budgets,
and then examine the role of the jump-bidding. Given ￿nite budgets, the auctions are
￿nite games whether or not jumps are allowed. In the case of no jumps, we easily solve
the game backwards. At a node where one bidder￿ s budget would need to be exceeded
in order to continue, that bidder must drop out. Knowing this, when we get within one
bid of exhausting the lower budget, the bidder with the higher budget will continue and
the bidder with the lower budget will drop out. Inducting on this logic, the bidder with
the lower budget will drop out at the ￿rst opportunity.
Why do things change with jump-bidding? Here, even if a bidder has the lower
budget, if that bidder￿ s value and budget both exceed the other bidder￿ s value, then that
bidder can preemptively bid an amount that causes the other to drop out. This ability
operates asymmetrically between the two bidders because of the ￿rst mover advantage
of bidder 1.
10Notice that 1￿ s ￿rst mover advantage is not limited to situations in which bidder 1
can pro￿tably preempt bidder 2 already in the ￿rst move. The scenarios covered by Part
(iii) include ones in which [V1]" < [V2]" and both valuations are substantially smaller than
B2 < B1. In such a scenario, even the maximal bid that does not exceed 1￿ s valuation,
[V1]", does not preempt bidder 2 who can respond with a bid that exceeds [V1]" and is still
below [V2]". To understand how bidder 1 might still preempt 2 in this situation, imagine
that the bidders race each other by submitting in each round the maximal bids [V1]" and
[V2]" that do not exceed their respective valuations. If there are no budget constraints,
then since [V1]" < [V2]" eventually they will reach a point where in order to surpass 2￿ s
bid, bidder 1 will have to bid more than [V1]". This will happen in round k described
in Part (iii) of the proposition. In any equilibrium in this subgame, bidder 1 drops out.
Thus, if this round k is reached before B2 is depleted, then inducting backwards from
this subgame, bidder 1 would already drop out in round k ￿ 1 of this race and hence in
round k￿2 and so on to the beginning. Alternatively, if B2 would be depleted along this
race before round k is reached, then bidder 1 would win this race once B2 is depleted and
inducting backwards, bidder 2 would drop out after 1 takes the ￿rst step in the race.
The following example illustrates the above points.
Example 1 An Example where the low value wins.
Let V1 = 10:5, V2 = 13:5, B2 = 15 < B1 = 20 and " = 1.
If bidder 2 moved ￿rst, then it is clear that bidder 2 would win, as the bidder could
preemptively jump-bid to 11, after which bidder 1 would drop out.
However, consider what happens when bidder 1 moves ￿rst. Suppose that bidder 1
bids 6 in the ￿rst round. Now consider any bid b ￿ 6 by bidder 2, such that 2 stays in
the auction. It must be that b ￿ [V2]" = 13. If 1 then responded with a bid of 16, then
2￿ s budget will be exceeded and so 1 will win. This gives 1 a strictly positive incremental
payo⁄(as 6 of the bid is already sunk) and so 1 would be willing to make such a bid, and
can thus win the auction outright. While this is not the actual equilibrium continuation,
it does show that 1 can win and thus must stay in the auction. It is then easy to argue
that 1 will win in any continuation. Inducting, it makes no sense for 2 to make any bid
b ￿ 6 and so 2 drops out immediately.
The example points out another feature of the equilibrium behavior. Bidder 1 will
actually bid 3 in the ￿rst period in all equilibria. If 1 bids 2 or less, then by jumping to
13, bidder 2 would surely win in the continuation. If 1 bids at least 3, then the maximal
11bid that 2 is willing to make still makes it worthwhile for 1 to stay in the auction at the
next round, and then 1 is within striking distance of 2￿ s budget. In the scenario in which
jump-bidding is not allowed, the winner never pays more than ". But, as the example
shows, when jump-bids are allowed, the winner may have to bid more than the minimum.
In the cases described in Part (ii) of the proposition, it is still the case that bidder 2 wins
at 0 cost. But in the cases described in Parts (i) and (iii), bidder 1 might have to bid a
signi￿cant amount. Of course, in all of these cases the loser does not bid. For example,
in a scenario with [V1]" < [V2]" that ￿ts into Part (iii), if it is the case that B2 is close to
k[V1]", then in order to win bidder 1 would have to start with a bid that is close to [V1]".
The observation that bidder 1 might submit a substantial bid in the ￿rst round might
seem somewhat surprising given that there is complete information and a certain winner
in all equilibria.
5 Discussion
Our analysis has focussed on alternating moves auctions and under complete information.
We close with a brief discussion of alternative formulations.
5.1 Incomplete Information
As wars-of-attrition with incomplete information are well-studied in the context of ￿xed
rates of bid increases, we examine the impact of jump-bidding. For simplicity, we examine
a case with in￿nite budgets.
Let Fi denote the distribution of Vi, and suppose that the bidder￿ s values are inde-
pendently distributed. We assume that Fi is atomless and has connected support, and
that the distributions have the same support.
For the purposes of this section, we let bidders bid any amount in <+, rather than
on a discrete grid. Play still alternates, and player 2 needs only to match player 1￿ s bid
to stay in the auction, while player 1 needs to exceed player 2￿ s current bid. To keep the
game well-de￿ned, we presume that player 1 needs to bid at least b2 + " after the ￿rst
period in order to stay in the auction.
Proposition 5 There exists a sequential equilibrium, with the following behavior on the
equilibrium path. In the ￿rst period, bidder 1 bids b(V1) where




12Bidder 2 responds to b1 by either dropping out if V2 < b￿1(b1), and by bidding b￿1(b1) if
V2 ￿ b￿1(b1), in which case 1 then drops out.
Since in this equilibrium the highest valuation bidder always wins, by revenue equiv-
alence the total expected payments made by the bidders equal the expectation of the
lower value among the two. The equilibrium has an interesting interpretation. Bidder
1 bids as if it is a sealed-bid, all-pay auction, where 1 will win if and only if 1 has the
higher value. Bidder 2 then responds by dropping out if 2 has a value lower than bidder
1￿ s revealed value, and bidding bidder 1￿ s revealed value otherwise (in which case 1 sub-
sequently drops out). Given that the actions are consistent with the high value winning,
the equilibrium holds together. The e¢ cient outcome means that the expected revenue
had better be the same as that of a second-price (winner pays) auction, which it is.
There is no reason to suppose that this equilibrium is unique. In the context of a
closely related model (Dekel, Jackson and Wolinsky (2006)), we showed that, when there
is su¢ ciently ￿little￿ incomplete information, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) outcome that is close to the complete-information outcome. The sense in which
the incomplete information is small is that most of the mass of the distribution Fi is
concentrated on the value ~ Vi where ~ V2 > ~ V1 + ", and the sense in which equilibrium
outcome is close to the complete information outcome is that with large probability bidder
2 wins at zero cost. The model there is di⁄erent in some small details, so we cannot just
state this result here without reproving it. However, the model here is su¢ ciently close
to the model there to make it a bit super￿ uous to repeat the result here. So we only
mention it informally as a result that is likely to hold here as well.
5.2 Simultaneous Moves
Suppose that the players move simultaneously in each period rather than sequentially.
The results for the environment with no jump-bidding are essentially independent of
whether the moves are simultaneous or sequential. For the environment with jump-
bidding the analysis becomes much harder with simultaneous moves and it is not clear
whether all the results survive, in particular whether the uniqueness results still hold.
For example, consider the case in which budgets are in￿nite. We can show the following.
Proposition 6 In the simultaneous game with jump-bidding and in￿nite budgets:6
6To keep the game as similar as possible to the previous analysis, we let bidder 2 win ties. The game
13(i) If V2 + " ￿ V1, then there exists an equilibrium where bidder 1 bids once to a price
of " and then bidder 2 drops out.
(ii) If V1+" ￿ V2, then there exists an equilibrium where bidder 1 drops out immediately
and bidder 2 wins at a price of 0.
So, the equilibria of Proposition 2 extend to the simultaneous move game, but we have
not been able to rule out the possibility that there are also other mixed-strategy equilibria.
One of the key di¢ culties is that the proof of Lemma 1 relies on the sequentiality of the
moves and hence the lemma cannot be invoked.
5.3 Many Bidders.
In the complete information analysis, we did not use the two-bidders assumption in an
important way and all the results extend in a straightforward manner to the case of mul-
tiple bidders. Due to the complete information, the relevant competition is between the
two strongest bidders and the presence of the others does not matter. In the incomplete
information scenario, the presence of more bidders might a⁄ect the result as we know
from other auction contexts.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider an equilibrium path along which play continues
beyond the ￿rst two periods (i.e., beyond the ￿rst bid of each of the players) with positive
probability. Let t be a period that is reached with positive probability along this path.
Let ￿t
i denote the probability that bidder i drops out in period t (in which i is called to
move) along this path. Observe the following.
(i) If t > 1, then ￿t
i > 0. This follows from Lemma 1 since otherwise t would not
have been reached.
(ii) If i bids at t > 2, then ￿
t￿1
j ￿ "=Vi. This follows from i￿ s 0 incremental payo⁄
from t on (implied by (i) above) and the fact that i0s expected bene￿t of not dropping
out in t ￿ 2 is ￿
t￿1
j Vi ￿ ".
(iii) If ￿
t￿1
j > "=Vi, then ￿
t￿2
i = 0.
(iv) If t > 3, then ￿
t￿1
j = "=Vi. From observations (ii) and (iii) above, the only
alternative is ￿
t￿1
j > "=Vi that implies ￿
t￿2
i = 0 that together with Lemma 1 implies
￿
t￿3
j = 1 in contradiction to the assumption that the play on the path continues beyond
t ￿ 3.
(v) If t > 2, then ￿t
i < 1, since ￿t
i = 1 would imply ￿
t￿1
j = 0 in contradiction to (ii)
above.
Thus, if play continues beyond the second period, then (v) implies that the mixing
goes on forever and (iv) implies ￿2
2 ￿ "=Vi and for t ￿ 3, ￿t
j = "=Vi. This characterizes
all such equilibria and it immediate to verify that they are indeed equilibria.
15It is also easy to verify that there also exists an equilibrium in which play stops in the
￿rst period with bidder 1 dropping out, i.e., ￿1
1 = 1, and an equilibrium in which play
stops in the second period, i.e., ￿1
1 = 0, ￿2
2 = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that Vi ￿ Vj +". Let bi and bj denote the latest bids
by i and j.
We prove by induction that, for any k ￿ 0; if bi ￿ bj + k" then bidder j quits in any
SPE in a subgame starting with j￿ s move.
Initial step: The above holds for k such that k" = [Vj]" + (j ￿ 1)". Obviously, if
bi ￿ bj +[Vj]" +(j ￿1)", bidder j quits in any SPE in a subgame starting with j￿ s move.
Notice that (j ￿ 1)" re￿ ects the asymmetry between 1 and 2, whereby to win 1 has to
bid strictly more than 2 while 2 has just to match.
Induction step: Suppose that the result holds for some _ k > 0, then it also holds for
k ￿ 1; that is, if bi ￿ bj + (k ￿ 1)" then j quits in any SPE in a subgame starting with
its move.
Suppose to the contrary that bi ￿ bj + (k ￿ 1)", and j bids with positive probability
when called upon to move. Let b0
j be a bid in the support of bids by j. Clearly b0
j ￿
bj +[Vj]" (as otherwise it is better for j to quit). If i were to respond with b0




i ￿ bj + (k ￿ 1)" + [Vi]":
Since [Vi]" ￿ [Vj]" + ", it follows that
b
0
i ￿ bj + k" + [Vj]" ￿ b
0
j + k":
By the inductive hypothesis, j drops out and i wins. Thus, i has a strategy which
in response to b0
j wins for sure at the next node controlled by i and gives i positive
incremental payo⁄. However, by Lemma 1, i must quit with positive probability in any
SPE in the subgame that starts after b0
j, which means that i￿ s incremental payo⁄ from
continuing is not positive, yielding a contradiction.
From the above induction, we can conclude that, if Vi ￿ Vj + " and bi ￿ bj, then j
drops out with certainty in any SPE starting with its move.
The proposition follows from noting that this implies that, if V1 ￿ V2 + ", then by
bidding " in the ￿rst move bidder 1 induces 2 to drop out and wins; and if V2 ￿ V1 + ",
then by matching bidder 1￿ s ￿rst bid (which must clearly not exceed V1 and hence be
less than V2), bidder 2 induces bidder 1 to drop out at the next node. Therefore, bidder
1 drops out immediately and bidder 2 wins at a price of 0.
Proof of Proposition 3:
16We o⁄er the proof for the case where B1 ￿ B2+". The other case is analogous (noting
that 2 needs only match 1￿ s bid to keep the auction going, while 1 needs to exceed 2￿ s
bid).
Step 1. Consider a subgame where 1￿ s outstanding bid b1 ￿ B2 ￿ ([V1]" ￿ "). In the
unique equilibrium continuation: at any node where 1 moves, 1 remains in the auction,
while at any node where 2 moves 2 quits.
1 is guaranteed a positive payo⁄by continuing to the point where b0
1 ￿ B2 +". Thus,
1 will stay in at any node in the subgame. The result then follows from Lemma 2 and 1
Step 2. By induction: Suppose that in any subgame where b1 ￿ B2 ￿ k([V1]" ￿ "), at
any node where 1 moves 1 remains in the auction, while at any node where 2 moves 2
quits. Then in the unique equilibrium continuation starting from any subgame where
b1 ￿ B2 ￿ (k + 1)([V1]" ￿ "), at any node where 1 moves 1 remains in the auction, while
at any node where 2 moves 2 quits.
It follows from the inductive hypothesis that if i remains in the game until b0
1 =
B2 ￿ k([V1]" ￿ ") then 1 wins, and 2 quits. The incremental cost to i is at most [V1]"
and so i is guaranteed a positive payo⁄ by staying in, and again the result follows from
Lemma 2 and 1.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The following lemma is useful.
Lemma 3 Suppose that B2 < B1. Consider a subgame where outstanding bids are b1 and
b2, the auction has not ended, and it is 1￿ s turn to move. Let k(b1;b2) be the minimal
integer k such that b1 + k[V1]" ￿ b2 + (k ￿ 1)[V2]" (set it equal to 1 if no such k exists).
In any subgame perfect equilibrium if b1 + k(b1;b2)[V1]" > B2, then 1 wins in one step
(and 2 drops out immediately); if b1 + k(b1;b2)[V1]" ￿ B2, then 1 drops out immediately
and 2 wins.
Proof of Lemma 3: Note that we are in a case where [V1]" ￿ [V2]" and b1 ￿ b2 (or
the auction would have ended). Let us proceed by induction on the di⁄erence between
B2 and b1. We ￿rst show that it is true if B2 ￿ b1 ￿ [V1]". In this case we may have
b1+k(b1;b2)[V1]" ￿ B2, only if k(b1;b2) = 1 which implies b1+[V1]" ￿ b2 and hence 1 loses
since it can at most match b2 without exceeding its own value. If b1+k(b1;b2)[V1]" > B2,
then k(b1;b2) > 1. From the minimality of k(b1;b2) it follows that b1 + [V1]" > b2 and,
since by assumption b1 + [V1]" ￿ B2, it follows that by bidding b1 + [V1]", 1 is sure to
win. (This follows since if b1 + [V1]" > B2 then 2 would not be able to match, while if
b1 + [V1]" = B2 then 2 would be able to just match and then lose in the next round.)
17Furthermore, since 2 would drop out immediately following 1￿ s bid of b1 + [V1]", this bid
guarantees a positive incremental payo⁄ to 1. Therefore, in any SPE 1 is increasing its
bid at this subgame so by Lemmas 1 and 2 bidder 2 drops out immediately following 1￿ s
bid. This establishes the lemma for B2 ￿ b1 ￿ [V1]".
Now, suppose that the lemma holds whenever B2 ￿ b1 ￿ T" and let us show that
it is true when B2 ￿ b1 ￿ (T + 1)". Suppose that b1 + k(b1;b2)[V1]" > B2 and that 1
bids b0
1 = b1 + [V1]". 2￿ s best response in the subgame must be either to drop out in
which case 1 wins, or to bid b0
2 ￿ b2 + [V2]". In that case, we are in a situation where
k(b0
1;b0
2) ￿ k(b1;b2) ￿ 1 and hence b0
1 + k(b0
1;b0
2)[V1]" ￿ b1 + k(b1;b2)[V1]" > B2: Since
B2 ￿ b0
1 ￿ T" it follows from the inductive assumption that 1 wins. Therefore, in any
SPE following b0
1, bidder 2 drops immediately. Therefore, b0
1 brings positive incremental
payo⁄ to bidder 1. Therefore, in any SPE in the subgame starting with b1 and b2 bidder
1 increases its bid and, by Lemmas 1 and 2, bidder 2 drops out immediately. Suppose
next that b1 + k(b1;b2)[V1]" ￿ B2. To any bid b0
1 by 1 such that b1 < b0
1 ￿ b1 + [V1]",
bidder 2 can respond with b0
2 = b2 + [V2]" so that k(b0
1;b0




2)[V1]" ￿ b1 +k(b1;b2)[V1]" ￿ B2 and it follows from the inductive assumption
that following b0
2, bidder 1 drops immediately. Therefore, b0
2 gives bidder 2 positive
incremental payo⁄ which means that in any SPE bidder 2 increases its bid at this point
and by Lemmas 1 and 2 bidder 1 drops immediately.
Let us now complete the proof of Proposition 4.
If minfB1;[V1]"g > minfB2;[V2]"g, then by bidding minfB1;[V1]"g bidder 1 would
win for sure (as 2 could either not match the bid, or would not wish to) and so 1 must
have a positive payo⁄ at the ￿rst node (noting that V1 > [V1]"). Thus, 1 must bid in the
￿rst node with probability 1. Thus, 1 must win by Lemmas 1 and 2.
If minfB1;[V1]"g ￿ minfB2;[V2]"g, and B1 ￿ minfB2;[V2]"g, then 2 can win for sure
at 2￿ s ￿rst move and get a positive payo⁄ just by bidding B1 when called on to bid. The
result again follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.
So, consider a case where [V1]" ￿ minfB2;[V2]"g < B1. The result then follows from
Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let us ￿rst completely specify the behavior o⁄the equilibrium
path.
If 1 bids according to b(z) and 2 responds with a bid of more than b￿1(b1) at 2￿ s ￿rst
move, then 1 believes that V2 > V1 and drops out.
If 2 responds with a bid in the interval [b1;b￿1(b1)), then 1 believes that V2 < V1 and
1 then continues by bidding the minimal amount to stay in the auction at all subsequent
18nodes, subject to the incremental bid not exceeding V1.
If 2 responds with a bid of at least b￿1 (b1), and 1 does not drop out, then 2 be-
lieves that V1 = b￿1 (b1), and continues to match all of 1￿ s subsequent bids, provided 2￿ s
incremental bid does not have to exceed V2.
First, note that the function b(z) has the property that
V1 = argmax
z [V1F2(z) ￿ b(z)]
Next, given 1￿ s behavior, note that 2￿ s response is optimal, since if 2 bids in [b(z);z),
the only way to win subsequently, would be to jump by more than V1, which 2 believes
to be equal to z.
Consider now 1. Suppose it bids b(z). Following this bid 2 believes that V1 = z and
responds accordingly. If 2 responds with bid z and 1 then jumps again, 2 would continue
like in the complete information and the only way 1 can win is by a jump that exceeds
V2. Thus, 1￿ s expected payo⁄ from bidding b(z) is
V1F2 (z) ￿ b(z) + [1 ￿ F2 (z)][1￿ s value of continuation after 2￿ s bid of z]
Now,
[1￿ s value of continuation after 2￿ s bid of z]
(







1￿F2(t)g if z < V1
The explanation is as follows. If 2 bid z ￿ V1, then V2 ￿ z and 1 will have to jump by
more than z ￿ V1 to win, so it optimal for 1 to quit and the value of continuation is 0. If
z < V1 and 2 responded with z, 1 will have at some point to jump by more than V2 in order
to win. This will happen only if V2 ￿ V1, which occurs with the conditional probability
F2(V1)￿F2(z)






[1￿ s expected payo⁄ from bidding b(z)]
(
= V1F2(z) ￿ b(z) if z ￿ V1






1￿F2(t)g if z < V1
Now, since









] = V1F2(V1) ￿ b(V1)
19and since, by construction,
V1 = argmax
z [V1F2(z) ￿ b(z)]
it follows that 1￿ s expected payo⁄ from bidding b(z) is maximized at b(V1).
Proof of Proposition 6: We examine the case where V1 ￿ V2 + ". The other case is
the similar, except that 2 does not need to bid with tied bids. We simply describe the
bidding behavior (at an arbitrary node), which is easily checked to be a best response at
any node. Let the current standing bids be b1 and b2.
￿ If b1 ￿ b2 > 0, then 1 bids 0 and 2 bids 0 and 1 wins.
￿ If b1 ￿ b2 = 0, then 1 bids 1 and 2 bids 0, and then at the next stage 1 wins.
￿ If b1 ￿ b2 = ￿k", where (k + 1)" < V1, then 1 bids (k + 1)" and 2 bids 0, and then
at the next stage 1 wins.
￿ Otherwise, 1 bids 0 and 2 bids 0, and 2 wins.
20